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Abstract— Mc Corskey and al, 1977 have shown there is a 
link between a high aversion to oral communication and a 
lower self-esteem. We investigate if the Leviathan model which 
considers agents gossiping and having an opinion of each other 
(Deffuant et al 2013) is able to reproduce such a correlation. 
Our virtual agents form their opinions in face-to-face meetings. 
During these meetings, they act in self-defence applying vanity, 
and influence each other. They also gossip about their peers. In 
direct meeting and gossiping, a highly valued speaker 
compared to listener’s self-opinion is more influential. The 
vanity impact depends on the distance between one’s opinion of 
one self and the opinion conveyed by the speaker. Listeners felt 
held in low esteem sanction their speakers by decreasing their 
opinion of them. Those felt held in high esteem reward them by 
increasing their opinion of them. We modified the probability 
to talk of agents to consider a heterogeneous one: static 
depending on the agent itself, or dynamic depending on her 
self-esteem. The simplest law to obtain a heterogeneous 
probability to talk is sufficient to reproduce our search 
correlation. However, we also discover that the model argue it 
is possible to have a higher self-esteem for someone talking less 
than the others in some circumstances. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
C CROSKEY, DALY al. (1977)  have shown there is 
a link between a high aversion to oral communication 
and a lower self-esteem whatever the age. However, 
they can’t conclude about an explanation telling 
someone has a low self-esteem due to a communication 
apprehension or vice-versa. Moreover, these authors tell 
about some experiments showing these people also tends to 
have a less positive reputation than people talking more. 
This seminal work has been confirmed by more recent 
studies (see Wood and Forest 2011, p. 273 for a short 
review). 
The Leviathan model simulates the dynamics of esteem of 
everyone for everyone comprised themselves. It allows the 
observation of the self-esteem dynamics as well as the 
reputation dynamics. Indeed for some parameters, agents 
reach consensuses on everyone’s value that can be defined 
as reputations (Emler 1990).  The basic version proposed by 
(Deffuant, Carletti and Huet 2013) considers everyone talks 
                                                          
 This work was not supported by any organization 
to others with the same probability. Then it is impossible in 
this model observing the correlations pointed out by 
(McCroskey, Daly, Richmond and Falcione 1977). We aim 
to study the minimum change to operate in the Leviathan 
model to obtain such a correlation: is it sufficient for people 
talking with a different probability or is it necessary to take 
into account the level of self-esteem to define the probability 
to talk? To answer, we studied some variants of the 
Leviathan model in which agents have their own probability 
to talk, different from the others’ probability.  
The Leviathan model has been recently proposed. It 
brings a new and unique insight into the relation between 
agent respective evaluations and group structure. What is the 
essence of this model? It is a theory explaining how people 
structure themselves from the agent need to form an opinion 
of the others, including themselves. It considers agent 
interaction through meeting in pairs. Motivated by the need 
to be held in high esteem (Hobbes 1651), agents act in self-
defence, applying a process called vanity. They protect 
themselves from being despised by sanctioning the despiser, 
or favour a compliment by rewarding the compliment giver. 
They also gossip about their peers influencing each other 
with regard to what they think of them. Gossip varies in 
intensity, from its absence to a high number of discussed 
peers: the more people a speaker talks about, the more 
intense is the gossiping during a meeting. The impact of 
gossiping is considered according to various levels of 
openness of people. This openness corresponds to a 
parameter controlling how high a speaker should be held in 
esteem to influence the listener. Very open-minded agents 
are influenced whatever their level of esteem for their 
speaker. Very narrow-minded agents are only influenced by 
the speakers held in high esteem. The strength of gossip is 
also ruled by a propagation coefficient. This coefficient and 
the openness are also used to control how strongly two 
talkers influence each other. 
Various structure forms called dynamic behavioural 
patterns emerge from the meeting dynamics of the Leviathan 
model. The result could be an absolute dominance, a very 
hierarchical society, or a crisis in which everyone hates each 
other, including themselves. In these three patterns, each 
agent has a reputation. Egality and elite are also power 
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structure forms emerging from the Leviathan model. 
However, agents of these forms have no reputation. The 
equilibrium of the structure is based on privileged 
relationships between subgroups of agents, and/or positive 
self-opinions. 
Overall it is possible to study self-esteems and reputations 
in this model with regard to a heterogeneous tendency to talk 
of the agents. We particularly focus on people talking less 
than the others. In the model, but also for “real”, these 
people are less submitted than others to sanctions and 
rewards since they less frequently say the others what they 
think of them. At the same time they are less susceptible to 
convince the others while the others, especially those talking 
a lot, have many occasions to influence them. Thus this is 
very difficult to anticipate if someone talking less in the 
model is more likely to have a lower self-esteem, as it is the 
case in the study of (McCroskey, Daly, Richmond and 
Falcione 1977). 
Our study shows the model is able to reproduce the results 
of the (McCroskey, Daly, Richmond and Falcione 1977)’s 
study supporting a relation between a high aversion to oral 
communication and a low self-esteem. The simplest law to 
obtain a heterogeneous probability to talk is sufficient to 
reproduce our searched correlation. However, we also 
discover that the model argues it is sometimes possible to 
have a higher self-esteem for someone talking less if the 
aversion to oral communication is an agent’s personal trait. 
The results regarding the reputations are close to those 
regarding the self-esteems. 
While the next section is dedicated to a short review of 
the body of literature regarded the Leviathan model, the 
following one presents the model as well as our 
experimental design. A section presenting the results of our 
analysis comes next. A final section is entirely focused onto 
synthesizing and discussing our conclusions. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE MODEL 
In the following we sum-up what we already know about the 
Leviathan model which is susceptible to help our study. 
The model is called Leviathan in reference to (Hobbes 
1651) who pointed out that the feeling to be undervalued is a 
major source of violence. In practice, the basic Leviathan 
model (Deffuant, Carletti and Huet 2013) assumes that each 
agent can have a continuous opinion about every other 
agent, truncated if necessary to remain between -1 and +1. In 
the initial state, the agents don't have an opinion about the 
others. The agents interact in randomly chosen pairs to 
which two different processes are applied. The first one 
supposes that during any interaction, each agent propagates 
her opinions about herself, about her interlocutor and about 
several randomly chosen other known agents. In this 
propagation, highly valued agents are more influential, with 
a strength due to an agents’ parameter called the openness. 
The second process represents a vanity effect: an agent likes 
to be highly valued by the others, thus she increases her 
opinion on those who value her well. On the contrary, she 
decreases her opinion of those who undervalue on her. These 
assumptions are not only inspired by Hobbes, but also by 
more recent experiments and observations from social-
psychologists (Fein and Spencer 1997; Buckley, Winkel and 
Leary 2004; Srivastava and Beer 2005; Leary, Twenge and 
Quinlivan 2006; Stephan and Maiano 2007; Wood and 
Forest 2011). Moreover, we suppose that the access to the 
opinion of the others is not perfect: people may not express 
exactly what they think and the listener may misinterpret 
these expressions. To take this into account in the model, the 
propagated opinions are distorted by noise.  
From its first study, two types of states emerge from this 
model. They differ from each other through the notion of 
reputation. They are: 
 Hierarchized states where direct influence between 
talkers, and influence via gossiping are stronger than 
vanity and lead to a consensus on everyone’s value, that 
we call reputation. These reputations are hierarchized 
and each agent can be seen as occupying her own rank 
in the hierarchy. Agents with a positive reputation are 
identified as leaders. These consensual leaders 
characterise two power structure forms emerging from 
the dynamics: the absolute dominance or a multiple-
leaders hierarchy. There is one structure form without  
leaders: the dynamic behavioural pattern “crisis” in 
which each agent has a very negative opinion of all the 
others and of herself. 
 Non-hierarchized states where vanity has a stronger 
impact on the dynamics and leads to population states in 
which there is no consensus about opinions. However, 
some structure forms are grounded in some positive 
relationships between agents: the dynamic behavioural 
patterns “egality” and “elite”. In egality, each agent has 
a positive opinion about herself; she is connected by 
strong positive mutual opinions with a small set of 
agents and has very negative opinions about all the 
others. All agents have a similar number of positive 
(and negative) links. For some parameters, the network 
of positive links shows the characteristics of small 
world networks. The elite pattern shows two categories 
of agents: the elite and second category agents. The elite 
agents have a positive self-opinion and are strongly 
supported by a friend, but they have a very negative 
opinion of all the other elite agents and of all the second 
category agents. The second category agents have a 
very negative self-opinion, they have a very negative 
opinion of all the other second category agents and their 
opinion about the elite agents is moderate.  
The first study (Deffuant, Carletti and Huet 2013) has 
pointed out the relative importance of the propagation 
coefficient of the influence compared to the vanity. This 
explains how people reach a dynamic pattern based on 
consensuses or another dynamic behavioural pattern. 
In (Huet 2014), we focussed on the understanding of the 
effect of gossip in the Leviathan. Firstly we showed the 
intensity of gossip favours the consensus. Then, telling how 
important gossip is for the emergence and the maintenance 
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of consensuses taking the form of reputations, the Leviathan 
is in accordance with the social psychology literature (Emler 
1990; Foster 2004; Wert and Salovey 2004; Beersma and 
Van Kleef 2012). Similarly to what is outlined by these 
authors, gossip is a source of reputation, giving each agent a 
status structuring the population. It maintains the agent 
status and thus the group structure. It guarantees the 
connection between people and a sufficient level of 
agreement regarding the structure.  
Secondly, gossip helps the emergence of leaders. Indeed, 
from Deffuant et al (2013), we know leaders only appear 
when reputations are consensual and the propagation 
coefficient sufficiently large compared to the vanity. It gives 
agents held in high esteem the opportunity to impose her 
standpoint about everyone’s value since everyone agrees on 
her higher status. In the social literature, if gossip has been 
often cited in terms of status maintenance, it has rarely cited 
for high status emergence (to our knowledge, except (Emler 
1990)), even if the danger of gossip for the reputation have 
been often discussed (Foster 2004). (Huet 2013a) has shown 
in the Leviathan that, since the gossip is introduced in the 
dynamics for a sufficient level of openness, a leader is 
susceptible to appear in the population. Also, the number of 
leaders only depends on the level of openness since agents 
practice gossiping. The question about the characteristics of 
the leaders and the various associated leadership styles is a 
matter of debate in social psychology (Hogg 2001; van 
Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, De Cremer and Hogg 2004; 
Uhl-Bien 2006; Martin 2009; Huet 2013a). 
Thirdly, we stressed out how the openness ruling the 
influence strength of a given level of esteem is important, 
especially for the positivity bias. The positivity bias is 
always present for a very low openness favouring almost 
only the influence of those held in high esteem. An increase 
of the openness decreases the strength of the positivity bias 
until it disappears. It is especially important when the 
number of peers discussed during a meeting is low or in 
absence of gossip. The positivity bias can be suppressed 
only if agents are open enough to the influence of people 
held in low esteem, and not only to the influence of agents 
held in high esteem.  
Above the importance of the openness, the change in the 
strength of the positivity bias differs a lot depending on the 
openness and the vanity and influence coefficients. Two 
various forms of positivity bias have been initially identified 
in the first study of the Leviathan which points out the 
importance of the vanity and influence coefficients, as well 
as the openness. The largest one is specific of the egality 
pattern. It is associated to a very low propagation coefficient 
of influence for a large vanity one. The agents maintain 
themselves with a good self-opinion in a dynamic relational 
equilibrium between few friends which flatters them and 
which are flattered in return, and a large number of foes 
which punishes them and which are punished in return. For 
these particular parameter values, the number of friends and 
foes is similar for every agent. Foes are agents held in low 
esteem while friends are agents held in a higher esteem 
compared oneself. The number of foes can be computed 
analytically as shown in (Deffuant et al 2013).  
The second form of positivity bias has been identified in 
(Deffuant et al 2013). On the contrary to the previous one, it 
is associated to a value of the influence coefficient higher 
than zero while the vanity coefficient is zero. The higher is 
someone’s self-opinion, the larger is her influence 
propagation coefficient (since the other’s opinion of her is 
very close to this self-opinion). The large influence is due to 
the asymmetry of the propagation coefficient computation 
ruled by the openness giving more influence to some agent 
held in high esteem. Because of this difference, when an 
agent self-opinion is higher than her reputation, the others 
have less influence on the self-opinion than when the self-
opinion is lower than the reputation (everything else being 
equal). However, the effect of this average difference 
between the self-opinion and the reputation depends on the 
value of the agent's reputation: the highly valued agents tend 
to lead the other's opinions and, with the statistical bias for a 
self-opinion higher than the reputation, they tend to increase 
their reputation. This is the contrary for the badly valued 
agents who tend to naturally decrease their self-opinion, only 
by the effect of the propagation coefficient.  
The general tendency of the model to generate more 
negative opinions has then been explained.  Indeed, the 
vanity process enhances the tendency of self-opinions to be 
higher than the reputations. The small statistical positive bias 
for self-opinion that is due to the opinion propagation 
observed in the second “positivity bias” case leads, on 
average, the agents to consider themselves as (slightly) 
undervalued by the others, thus they devalue them by vanity 
in return. This is very similar to the process that we observed 
for a close to zero coefficient of influence and a large 
coefficient of vanity, but it is slower because of the 
averaging effect of the opinion propagation. 
(Huet 2013b) has shown this general tendency is due to 
the form of the vanity function targeted everyone with the 
same strength. Indeed it can be changed if people held in 
high esteem are preferentially sanctioned or rewarded 
compared to those held in low esteem. Such a modification 
leads people viewing themselves majorly positively, or 
negatively, depending on the values of the parameters. 
III. MATERIAL AND METHODS 
A. The model 
We consider a set of N agents, each agent i is 
characterised by her list of opinions about the other agents 
and about herself: (ai,j)1 ≤i,j≤N . We assume ai,j lies between 
-1 and +1 , or it is equal to nil if the agent i never met j and 
nobody has talked to i about j yet. At initialisation, we 
suppose that the agents never met, therefore all their 
opinions are set to nil. When opinions change, we always 
keep them between -1 and +1, by truncating them to -1 if 
their value is below -1 after the interaction, or to +1 if their 
value is above +1. 
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The agents interact in uniformly and randomly drawn 
pairs (i, j) and at each encounter, we apply two processes: 
the face-to-face management, implying influence attempts 
and vanity between the two agents meeting each other; and 
the gossip, consisting in influence trials about people they 
know.  
We follow the people’s interactions considering a time 
range called iteration. We assume one iteration, i.e. one time 
step t →t + 1, is N/2 random pair interactions (each agent 
interacts N times on average during one iteration).  
We now describe in more details what occurs during a 
pair meeting. We first start with gossip, then continue with 
the management of the face-to-face before summarizing 
iteration and related interactions. 
 
Gossip: agents discuss their peers 
Let us assume that agents i and j have been drawn. During 
an encounter, we suppose that agent j propagates to i her 
opinions about herself (j), about i, and about k agents 
randomly chosen among her acquaintances. Moreover, we 
suppose that if i has a high opinion of j, then j is more 
influential.  
 
 
Figure 1. Examples of variations of the propagation coefficient pi,j when ai,j 
- ai,i varies, and for four values of the parameter σ. When decreases, this 
function tends towards a threshold function returning 0 for negative entries 
and 1 for positive entries. 
 
This hypothesis is implemented by introducing a 
propagation coefficient, denoted pi,j, which is based on the 
difference between the opinion of i about j (ai,j) and the 
opinion i about herself (ai,i). It uses the logistic function with 
parameter σ. If ai,j = nil (j is unknown to i), we assume that i 
has a neutral opinion about j and we set ai,j ← 0. Let us also 
observe that, at the initialisation, an agent has no opinion 
about herself (ai,i = nil), before she takes part in a first 
encounter, thus we also set ai,i ← 0. Then we compute the 
propagation coefficient pi,j, which rules the intensity of the 
opinion propagation from j to i :  
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The parameter , called openness, defines the slope of the 
function close to ai,j - ai,i   . Figure 1 represents the value 
of pi,j  when the difference ai,j - ai,i varies (between -2 and 
+2), for three different values of parameter σ. One can 
observe that pi,j  tends to 1 when ai,j - ai,i is close to 2 (i 
values j higher than herself), and tends to 0 when it is close 
to -2 (i values j lower than herself). Indeed, when  is small, 
pij rapidly changes from 0 to 1. When  is large, this change 
is progressive. 
A parameter ρ controls the impact of the coefficient pi,j. 
The agent i modifies her opinion about the agent z that j 
talked about applying the influence coefficient ρ by the 
propagation coefficient to the difference between what j told 
about z and what she thinks of z. However, i has no direct 
access to the opinion of j and can misunderstand j. To take 
into account this difficulty, we consider the perception of i 
as the value ajz more or less a uniform noise drawn between 
– and + ( is a model parameter). This random addition 
then corresponds to a systematic error the agents make 
regarding the others’ opinions. More formally, the process 
can be written in pseudo-code as follows: 
ALGORITHM N°1 
Gossip(i, j) 
    Repeat k times: 
 Choose randomly z taking into account ajz ≠ nil, z ≠ i, z ≠ j.   
 If aiz = nil,  aiz ← 0 
              
)),(Random(   izjzijiziz aapaa  
 
Random (-δ, δ) returns a uniformly distributed random 
number between -δ and +δ, that can be seen as a noise that 
distorts the perception that i has about j 's opinions. The 
parameter δ rules the amplitude of this noise. 
 
The face-to-face activates influence attempt and vanity 
During their first meeting, i and j don’t know each other 
and their opinions are nil. Then, they instantaneously 
become 0 which is the neutral opinion. This initiates the 
meeting dynamics and allows influence and vanity. 
Indeed, when agents i and j meet, they talk about 
themselves: i talks about herself and j, while j talks about 
herself and i. This direct exchange implies two processes 
occurring at the same time: influence of each of them on 
what they think about themselves and the other, and a vanity 
process applied by the listener to the talker. This vanity 
process expresses that agents tend to reward the agents that 
value them more positively than they value themselves and 
to punish the ones that value them more negatively than they 
value themselves. Then, added to the influence i received 
from j regarding what she thinks about j, the agent i 
compares her self-opinion aii to the opinion j tells about her 
aji. If the perceived opinion of the other (j) is higher than her 
self-opinion, i increases her opinion of j (reward). Else i 
decreases her opinion of j (punishment).  
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Parameter ω rules the importance of the vanity process. 
The modification of i's opinion of j is assumed as simply 
depending on the difference between the opinion of i about 
herself and the opinion of j about i (modified randomly 
slightly). 
The face-to-face can be formally described in pseudo-
codes as follows: 
ALGORITHM N°1 
Face-to-face(i,j) 
 if aii = nil,  aii ← 0 
if aij = nil,  aij ← 0 
   
)),(Random(   iijiijiiii aapaa  
 
)),(Random(
)),(Random(




iiji
ijjjijijij
aa
aapaa
 
 
During the interaction, face-to-face(i,j) and face-to-
face(j,i) are successively applied. 
 
Summary 
Finally, the model has 7 parameters: 
 the number of agents; 
 , maximum intensity of the noise when someone is 
alluded to; 
 , the reverse of the sigmoidal slope of the propagation 
coefficient, called the openness; 
 ρ, the parameter controlling the intensity of the 
coefficient of the influence process (applied to the 
propagation coefficient pij); 
 k, the number of acquaintances an agent talked about 
during a meeting – they are randomly chosen among her 
acquaintances; 
 , maximum intensity of the noise when someone is 
alluded to; 
 ɷ, the coefficient of the vanity process. 
The following algorithm describes one iteration: N/2 
random pairs of agents are drawn, with reinsertion, and we 
suppose that each agent influences the other during the 
encounter.  
ALGORITHM N°3 
Repeat N/2 times: 
Choose randomly a couple (i,j) with i chosen according to her  
     probability to talk and j chosen uniformly in the population (in  
        the basic model, the probability of i to talk is a constant) 
Save the opinions which are going to change in temporary  
   variables to ensure the update during the i and j meeting is  
   synchronous 
Face-to-face(i,j) 
Face-to-face(j,i) 
 Gossip(i,j) 
 Gossip(j,i) 
 
The update is synchronous: every opinion changes occurring 
during a meeting are computed based on the value of 
opinions taken at the beginning of a pair meeting.    
B. Hypothesis and methods 
We aim at studying the impact of a heterogeneous 
probability to talk of agents in the Leviathan model. To do 
so, the model can be changed in different manners and we 
consider several hypothesis or variants, going from the 
simplest to some more complex ones.  
This section describes our hypothesis as well as the 
corresponding experimental design and the measured 
indicators. A following subsection describes the results. 
 
Hypothesis 
We compare three hypotheses to the basic Leviathan 
model for which the probability to talk of an agent is the 
same for every agents.  In the two first hypotheses, the 
probability to talk of an agent is computed at the beginning 
of the simulation and remains constant over the time of the 
simulation. In the third hypotheses the talk probability 
changes during the simulation depending on the agent’s self-
esteem. 
 hypothesis “Uniform”: the probability of an agent is 
picked out at random following a uniform law;  
 hypothesis “Power”: the probability of an agent is 
picked out at random following a power law with a 
parameter which remains constant 1.1;  
 hypothesis “depends on self-esteem” with a parameter f 
corresponding to the frequency of update of the agent’s 
probability to talk depending on her self-esteem. This 
frequency is given in terms of number of meetings 
without updating her probability to talk – two values for 
f are tested: 20,000 and 1 (i.e. the probability to talk is 
computed every 20,000 meetings or every meeting). 
The two first hypotheses correspond to a situation in 
which the probability to talk is an agent’s trait. The last one 
is more situational and the probability to talk depends on the 
agent’s self-opinion at a given time. To test our hypotheses, 
we elaborate the following experimental design. 
C. Experimental design 
The model includes 7 parameters and it is difficult to 
make an exhaustive study in the complete parameter space. 
Considering the knowledge we already have onto the 
dynamics and the behaviour of the Leviathan model, we 
decide to vary our parameters as described above. These 
variations ensure a sufficient representativeness of the 
various behaviours of the model. 
 k the number of discussed acquaintances takes the 
values 2, 5, 10, 15;  
 σ the openness, ruling the slope of the logistic function 
determining the propagation coefficients takes the 
values 0.1, 0.4, 2 ; 
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 ρ ruling the intensity of the overall influence by being 
applied to the propagation coefficient takes three values: 
0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9; 
 ɷ ruling the intensity of the vanity:  0.02, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 
0.6, 0.8, 1; 
 N, the size of the population: 40 and 100; 
 δ the intensity of noise disturbing the evaluation of 
other's opinions takes only one value: 0.2  
For each set of parameter values, we run the model for 
300,000 iterations (one iteration corresponding to N/2 
random pair interactions), and we repeat this for 10 replicas. 
D. Measuring indicators 
From iteration 100,000 to 300,000, we measure every 
5,000 iterations a group of values allowing us to make 
conclusions about the impact of a heterogeneous probability 
to talk. The measures, averaging over times of a run and 
over the 10 replicas give us indicators.  
We measure the mean self-opinion and reputation of the 
population of agents as well as these means for four different 
subsets of agents.  These subsets correspond to the: 
1. The 25 % talking the least; 
2. The 25 % talking less (without the first subset); 
3. The 25 % talking more (without the last subset) ; 
4. The 25 % talking the most; 
We also diagnosed the dynamic behavioural patterns. 
IV. RESULTS OF THE STUDY THROUGH SIMULATIONS 
This section presents the influence of the various hypotheses 
regarding the probability to talk of agents. A first subsection 
shows an overview of these impacts. A second one 
investigates how these impacts relate to the dynamic 
population patterns diagnosed in Deffuant et al (2013). 
Finally we analysed the trajectories of the observed 
correlations for the most representative patterns. 
A. An overview of the various hypotheses 
The figure 2 presents the average results obtained over the 
totality of the experimental design for each hypothesis we 
consider. We notice from this figure two main results. 
 
 
Figure 2. Average difference of self-opinion between average 
everyone’s  and the average value of the least frequent talkers for the 
various tested value of ω and for the basic model in which the 
probability to talk is the same for everyone (blue diamonds), a 
probability to talk picked out at random in a uniform law (red square), a 
probability to talk picked out at random in a power law with a 
parameter valued 1.1 (green triangle), a probability to talk depending 
on the agent’s self-esteem and updated every 20000 face-to-face 
meetings (black stars) and every meeting (black crosses). 
 
The first one is that every hypothesis allows reproducing 
the results exhibiting by the social psychology literature. 
Indeed when the average self-opinion of the least frequent 
talkers is lower than the average self-opinion of the most 
frequent talkers, the difference is positive: the figure shows 
positive values for every results for ω ≥ 0.4 and the uniform 
or the power hypothesis, as well as those for the probability 
to talk depending on the agent’s self-esteem. It means even 
the simplest solution consisting in considering only an 
initial probability to talk picked out at random in a 
uniform law is sufficient to reproduce the result we are 
looking for: “rare” talkers and low self-opinions are 
correlated. When the probability to talk depends on the self-
esteem of each agent, the effect is larger whatever the 
frequency f of the update of this probability even if it tends 
to be slightly smaller for a large value of f. 
The second result is that the inverse correlation can be 
also observed in the model: it is possible that the “rare” 
talkers have a higher self-esteem than the average self-
esteem of the population. Indeed, for the basic and uniform 
hypotheses and ω < 0.4, the values are negative indicating 
that the average self-opinion of the least frequent talkers is 
higher than the average self-opinion of the whole population.  
As the results vary with ɷ, we assume the dynamic 
behavioural pattern, defined by the value of ɷ  and ρ can be 
a good way to better diagnose the impact of an 
heterogeneous probability to talk. Then to go further, we are 
going to look in which way these two contrary correlations 
relate to the dynamic behavioural patterns of the population 
identified in (Deffuant et al., 2013). 
B. Using the population patterns to describe 
Figures 3 and 4 show the relation between the two types 
of correlations between “rare” talkers and self-esteem we 
found, and the dynamic behavioural patterns of the 
population presented in the literature review section II.  
Figures 3 shows three important results: 
 The “rare” talkers are disfavoured in terms of self-
esteem in the non-reputational patterns in which the 
equilibrium is based on privileged relationship 
between small subgroups of people (ie the average 
difference is positive whatever the hypothesis). 
Moreover, one can notice for these non-reputational 
patterns that it is quite impossible to really distinguish 
the case of an initial difference in the probability to talk 
which corresponds to an agent’s trait from the case the 
probability to talk depends on the self-esteem of the 
agent. Indeed, even if the strength of the average is 
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slightly different in the various hypotheses, it varies in 
the same way depending on the pattern. 
 The pattern “elite” is always favoured in terms of 
probability to appear, whatever the hypothesis. Then the 
only fact to give a differentiated probability to talk 
to people makes the pattern “elite” much more 
probable in the parameter space. On the contrary, the 
patterns “egality” and “crisis” are less probable. 
 
 
Figures 3. Link between the nature of the correlation between self-esteem 
and the probability to talk given by the average difference of self-opinion 
between average everyone’s and the average value of the least frequent 
talkers, and the dynamic behavioural pattern for, from the top to the bottom 
right, compared to the basic case of a similar probability to talk for 
everyone: a probability to talk picked out at random in a uniform law, a 
probability to talk picked out at random in a power law with a parameter 
valued 1.1. The “empty” bars give the density of each patterns (density 
given on the right vertical axe), while the shadow ones give the nature of 
the correlation (value given on the left vertical axe). The error bars 
correspond to one standard-deviation for the indicator of the nature of the 
correlation. 
 
 The “rare” talkers are favoured in terms of self-
esteem in the reputational patterns in which a 
consensus is reached on everyone values for the case 
the probability to talk is an agent’s trait.  
Figure 4 shows how the self-esteem varies for lower 
talkers in the dynamic patterns for the hypothesis where 
probability to talk depends on self-esteem. Also, it shows the 
distribution over patterns is close to the hypothesis in which 
probability to talk is an individual’s trait: we especially 
observe the higher probability of the pattern elite compared 
to the basic hypothesis in which everyone has the same 
probability to talk. 
 
 
Figure 4. Link between the nature of the correlation between self-esteem 
and the probability to talk given by the average difference of self-opinion 
between average everyone’s and the average value of the least frequent 
talkers, and the dynamic behavioural pattern for, a probability to talk 
depending on the agent’s self-esteem and updated every 20000 face-to-face 
meetings and every meeting. The “empty” bars give the density of each 
patterns (density given on the right vertical axe), while the shadow ones 
give the nature of the correlation (value given on the left vertical axe). The 
error bars correspond to one standard-deviation for the indicator of the 
nature of the correlation. 
 
 
Figures 5. Variation of the average self-opinion (at the top) and the average 
reputation (at the bottom) for the dynamic behavioural patterns and the 
various hypotheses (presented at the bottom of the figures) for the two 
extreme groups of talkers (the least frequent (diamonds), the most frequent 
(black plain squares). Distance bars between the result for the most frequent 
talkers and the least frequent talkers are darker when the “rarer” talkers 
have an higher self-esteem, empty on the contrary. 
 
The figures 5 allow to precise when a “rare” talker is 
susceptible to be a part of the leader group if the probability 
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to talk is an individual’s trait (ie if the probability to talk 
does not dynamically depend on the agent’s self-opinion, 
conditions “power”) [corresponds to the darkest distance 
bars between the result for the most frequent talkers and the 
results for the least frequent talkers]. From the middle to the 
right, we can observe that the average self-opinion and 
reputation are higher for “rare” talkers [dark grey bars] for 
the hierarchy pattern but also for the crisis and the 
dominance patterns when σ is low (equal to 0.1).  
Figures 5 also show that the “rare” talkers have always the 
lower self-opinion for the patterns “egality” and “elite”, but 
also for the patterns “crisis” when σ is large enough (>0.1) 
and the probability to talk is an individual’s trait. Crisis (and 
dominance) are sort of transitory pattern in the parameter 
space between the two majorly present patterns that are elite 
and hierarchy. They often appear as transitory during the 
time of a simulation. That is why they are susceptible to 
show the two types of correlations between probability to 
talk and self-opinions depending on which kind of 
equilibrium they are close to or temporarily come from: elite 
or hierarchy. 
Finally, to have an explanation about why such 
correlations appear in the case the probability to talk is an 
individual’s trait, we’re going to study the trajectories of the 
two most representative patterns of these correlations: elite 
and hierarchy. 
C. Looking at the trajectories to understand 
We present in more details what occurs for the patterns 
elite (or a mixed egality/elite) and hierarchy since they 
produce the two types of correlations we are interested in. 
We begin with the correlation coherent with the literature: 
“rare” talkers have a low self-opinion. 
In order to see what occurs, we use a matrix 
representation in which the opinion list of each agent is 
represented as the row of a NxN square matrix. The element 
ai,j from line i and column j is the opinion of agent i about 
agent j. Then the column j represents the opinion on j which 
can be seen as the reputation of j. In the following 
representation, the agent’s representations are ordered 
following their probability to talk. The most frequent talkers 
is located at the bottom line and her reputation can be read in 
the first left column. The last column and the top line 
correspond to the least frequent talker. We use colours to 
code the opinions: blue for negative and red for positive 
opinions with light colours meaning that the absolute value 
is close to 0. This representation provides all the information 
about the state of the population at a given time step.  
 
Egality and elite 
Figures 6 and 7 show the mixed pattern egality/elite 
(figures 6) and the pattern elite (figure 7) at the equilibrium. 
In the figures 6, we clearly see an inner square 
corresponding to two possible descriptions of the egality 
pattern (from zero on the left, to a lot of “friends” on the 
right, depending on the value of σ (see Deffuant et al 2013 
for more explanations and the description of the patterns 
given in II)). This square is defined by the 75% more 
frequent talkers and constitute the elite part of the pattern 
elite. 
 
   
Figures 6.  Mixed dynamic behavioural pattern egality/elite: on the left 
k=5, δ=0.2, N=100, σ=0.1, ρ=0.1, ɷ=0.4, and on the right right k=4, δ=0.2, 
N=100, σ=0.4, ρ=0.3, ɷ=0.8. The agents’ frequency of talk decreases from 
the left to the right; the least frequent talker is the last agent on the right 
 
The 25% least frequent talkers (whose reputations are on 
the right and opinions are at the top of the figure) represents 
the second category agent who have a negative self-opinion 
and a moderately positive opinion of the elite members.  
The figure 7 shows the same two groups. It shows how 
the decreasing of the probability to talk affects how people 
are seen by others (visible from the left to the right: from 
majorly positive views to only negative views). This is clear 
from these representations that the most frequent talkers 
develop some symmetrical positive privileged relations 
between themselves while the least frequent talkers are 
despised by the 75% more frequent talkers and constitute the 
elite part of the pattern elite. The 25% least frequent talkers 
(whose reputations are on the right and opinions are at the 
top of the figure) represents the second category agents who 
have a negative self-opinion and a moderately positive 
opinion of the elite members.  
 
 
Figure 7. Pure dynamic behavioural pattern elite for k=5, δ=0.2, N=100, 
σ=0.3, ρ=0.3, ɷ=0.7. The agents’ frequency of talk decreases from the left 
to the right; the least frequent talker is the last agent on the right 
 
The figures 8 show the temporal trajectory of the pure 
elite pattern presented in the figure 7. We observe the time 
evolution during a replica of a simulation of the average 
reputations and the average self-opinions of the four quarters 
of agents defined by their frequency to talk. We can see how 
quick in the first iterations (see the figures at the bottom) 
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everyone despise everyone due to a very high vanity 
coefficient. However, around 4000 iterations, the most 
frequent talkers begin to stabilise each other by rewarding 
symmetrically themselves (or a subpart of themselves) while 
sanctioning the others. These “most” frequent talkers have 
the “most” frequent occasions to talk to each other and 
reward each other. That is the way they maintain a better 
self-opinion than the average one. The “rare” talkers who 
have the lowest probability to reward each other are on the 
contrary the ones having the lowest self-opinion. 
 
 
Figures 8. Temporal trajectory of the dynamic behavioural pattern elite for 
a replica of a simulation with parameters k=5, δ=0.2, N=100, σ=0.3, ρ=0.3, 
ɷ=0.7. Average reputation on the left, average self-opinion on the right with 
at the top the total trajectory, at the bottom only the first 25000 iterations 
 
We’re now investigating the hierarchy pattern to better 
understand why the inverse correlation appears between 
agent’s self-opinion and the probability to talk.  
 
Hierarchy 
In the hierarchy pattern, the “rare” talkers have the 
average better self-opinion when the probability to talk is an 
agent’s trait. Figure 9 shows a typical hierarchy pattern at 
the equilibrium state. We can observe that the reputations of 
the most frequent talkers (on the left) are very contrasted 
compared to the ones of the least frequent talkers (on the 
rights) which vary from slightly negative to positive. It 
appears less frequent talkers are protected from sanctions of 
deceived very positive agents compared to agent who talks 
frequently. 
 
 
Figure 9. Pure dynamic behavioural pattern hierarchy k=15, δ=0.2, 
N=100, σ=0.4, ρ=0.7, ɷ=0.2. The agents’ frequency of talk decreases from 
the left to the right; the least frequent talker is the last agent on the right. 
 
Figures 10 confirm this latter hypothesis. Indeed it shows 
for the same typical hierarchy pattern presented in fig. 9 how 
evolve over the time for a replica the average reputation (on 
the left) and the average self-opinion (on the right) of the 
population. At the beginning (see the bottom figures at about 
12500 iterations), the less frequent talkers are less punished 
and then remain more positive or closer to 0 on average. 
They are less rewarded in the interaction, but also less 
punished. It makes them more stable, also more in line with 
others in terms of reputation. Even when they talk, as they 
occupy an intermediate opinion, their distance to the others 
make them less punished or rewarded as well as remaining 
influent. That is why they have a better self-opinion and can 
have a greater chance to become a leader. 
 
 
Figures 10. Temporal trajectory of the dynamic behavioural pattern 
hierarchy for a replica of a simulation with parameters k=15, δ=0.2, N=100, 
σ=0.4, ρ=0.7, ɷ=0.2. Average reputation on the left, average self-opinion on 
the right with at the top the total trajectory, at the bottom only the first 
25000 iterations 
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V. SYNTHESIS AND DISCUSSION 
In the Leviathan model, we tried to consider various 
hypotheses giving agents heterogeneous probability to talk 
to the others. We consider some cases in which the 
probability to talk is an agent’s trait, and others in which the 
probability to talk of an agent is more situational, depending 
on the self-opinion of this agent at a given time.  We aimed 
to reproduce the results of (McCroskey, Daly, Richmond 
and Falcione 1977) regarding the correlation between an 
apprehension to communicate and a low self-esteem as well 
as a low reputation. We show even the simplest solution 
consisting in considering only an initial probability to talk 
picked out at random in a uniform law is sufficient to 
reproduce the result we are looking for: “rare” probability to 
talk and low self-opinions are correlated. This simplest 
solution from the modelling point of view corresponds to an 
agent’s trait hypothesis. 
However, if the correlation is always reproduced for a 
situational probability to talk depending on self-opinion, this 
depends on the global dynamics when the hypothesis 
corresponds to an agent’s trait. This global dynamics is 
given by the dynamic behavioural patterns identified in 
Deffuant et al, 2013. Indeed, for the non-reputational 
patterns based on privileged relationships between 
subgroup(s) of agents who have a positive self-opinion, a 
low probability to talk is correlated to a low self-opinion. On 
the contrary, for the reputational patterns in which agents are 
hierarchized with one or more positive leaders, a low 
probability to talk is correlated to a high self-opinion. 
We showed that in the non-reputational patterns, the 
equilibrium is based on the maintenance of privileged 
relationships which are quite symmetrical of people having a 
positive opinion of each other despite a negative opinion of 
all the others. When they meet each other, they confirm and 
reinforce their self-positive opinions by mutual influence but 
also by rewarding each other (or at least very slightly 
sanctioning). These meetings allow them to resist to the 
others’ contempt. Thus they maintain themselves at a 
sufficiently high level of influence since they keep a higher 
status compared to the majority of others. In comparison, 
someone talking less can’t develop a quite symmetrical 
relationship since she is exposed to the influence of others, 
especially those talking more, while they have rare occasions 
to influence in return and really help to maintain a positive 
self-view. That is why the “rare” talkers have a lower self-
esteem.  
We also noticed some changes in the distribution of 
dynamic behavioural patterns over the parameter space due 
to the heterogeneity of the probability to talk. The pattern 
“elite” is always favoured in terms of probability to appear, 
whatever the hypothesis. Only to give a differentiated 
probability to talk to people makes the pattern “elite” much 
more probable in the parameter space. On the contrary, the 
patterns “egality” and “crisis” are less probable. The “crisis” 
one is even close to disappear. This global result about the 
distribution of patterns over the parameter space sounds 
quite realistic and tends to confirm an heterogeneous 
probability to talk should be consider in the Leviathan 
model.  
The “rare” talkers are favoured in terms of self-esteem in 
the reputational patterns in which a consensus is reached on 
everyone’s value for the case the probability to talk is an 
agent’s trait. 
In the reputational patterns, when the probability to talk is 
an agent's trait, the "rare" talkers have a higher self-esteem 
than the average one. They are less rewarded in the 
interaction, but also less punished. It makes them more 
stable, also more in line with others in terms of reputation. 
Even when they talk, as they occupy an intermediate 
opinion, their distance to the other makes them less punished 
or rewarded as well as remaining influent. That is why they 
have a better self-opinion and a greater chance to become a 
leader. 
Finally, the model proposes that it is very different for 
individuals to talk less frequently with others than the 
average: 
1. because of their personal traits, as shyness for example 
(McCroskey 1982); 
2. because they want to protect their low self-esteem from 
contempt and influence (Wood and Forest 2011). 
Indeed, following our Leviathan model, the first one can 
lead in some circumstances to a high self-esteem, and 
sometimes to a leader position, while it can’t in the second 
one. If being intrinsically a “rare” speaker, not looking for 
social contact, is a disadvantage in terms of self-esteem in 
societies which are structurally based on close positive 
relationships, it is not in societies highly hierarchized, even 
those based on a unique despiser leader. 
We didn’t find until now elements of literature supporting 
this last result which does not seem “unrealistic”. This 
deserves further investigations.  
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